

THE EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY CRISIS ON EUROPEAN UNION STABILITY

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Abstract

The idea that the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht were required to expand with the potential to sustain the EU integration process and have a more democratic, cohesive, united, and advanced European integration were articulated, which gave birth to the European constitutional Treaty's crafting. The euphoria that greeted the idea was frustrated by the media and the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The paper examines the causes of the constitutional treaty crisis in Europe and addresses the effect the constitutional treaty crisis has on European stability. Structural functionalism and agenda-setting theories were used as theoretical orientations. Furthermore, qualitative data was sourced from textbooks, Internet amongst others. Descriptive and historical analyses were also employed in the paper. The findings revealed that the media coverage and gloomy predictions, as well as the citizens' alienation, generated the constitutional Treaty's Failure before France and Netherlands made the last straw that broke the camel's backbone with their referenda. Henceforth, it was recommended that media be objective in their reportage and should be neutral to devoid of subjective, insightful, sensational, and biased presentation of national and international issues to the general public.

Keywords: Constitutional Crisis, European Union, Treaty

1.0 Introduction

In an arrangement to expedite reform of the Communities and the European Union (EU), four consecutive Treaties were drafted between 1986 and 2001. However, despite the effort, the

treaties were unable to solve all the uncertainties on the agendas of various intergovernmental conferences (IGCs). Consequently, a call for an in-depth reform of the Union occupied the center stage for enlargement of the EU and the desire to make the EU structure and actions of the EU more democratic and transparent. Following this development, a group of concerned individuals decided to declare a plan for adopting a new idea to remove impediments that had hindered the dialogues on former treaties so strenuous and fruitless. To achieve this task, the Presidency called for the European Convention after in Laeken on 14 and 15 December 2001. Under the chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, with representatives from 28 countries and spokespersons from the European Parliament, they deliver proposals to the European Council on the requisite reforms and the next work of the IGC. The Constitution drafted by European convention attracted unanimity on June 13 and July 10, 2003, presented to the European Council's President. On October 4, 2003, the IGC met in Rome to discuss a draft copy of the new agreement, which only attracted a few amendments. The Brussels European Council then settled unresolved matters that conflicted with the Treaty's agreement establishing a Constitution for Europe. The Constitutional Treaty was eventually ratified in Rome on October 29, 2004. In ratification, the Constitution hits the rock of crisis (Pappalardo, 2016. p.1).

17 Member States signed the Constitutional Treaty but disapproved of France and the Netherlands in their national referenda in 2005. The term constitution, known to be a motivational influence for integration, manifestly had an adverse effect. The unexpected rejection by the people of the two founding Member States led to a period of uneasiness in Europe. The paper's very lucid objectives are to examine the causes of the constitutional treaty crisis in Europe and address the effect the constitutional treaty crisis has on European stability.

Apart from providing a comprehensive literary analysis of the constitutional treaty crisis, the paper contributes to the existing knowledge of the constitutional treaty crisis in a few ways. Firstly, the alienation of the citizens' interest at the formulation of the constitutional Treaty and the relegation of the press's potent power would have helped educate the citizens of the constitutional Treaty's good intentions. While discussing this, the paper focuses on the effect on European Union stability in more robust ways. The article has three different parts. Firstly, the causes of the constitutional treaty crisis, secondly, the impact of the problem on the European Union's stability, and thirdly, the paper's conclusion.

1.2. Theoretical Framework and Methodology

This paper employs two theories to explain the causes of the constitutional treaty crisis in the European Union. These are Structural functionalism by Almond and Powell and Media Agenda Setting Theory by McCombs and Shaw. Almond and Powell's political systems emphasize their structural institutions and their functions within the system. The structural-functionalism model submits that a political system comprises institutions (structures), such as interest groups, political parties, executive, legislative, judicial, and media. These institutions perform certain requisite functions for the survival of the political system. the media in this paper is the epicenter of the cause of the constitutional treaty crisis. The media played a vital role in distributing the constitutional Treaty's information to citizens. They then made substantial political judgments and shaped their perceptions, attitudes, and values in Europe. The theory is also essential as it relates to the public's fundamental function in the process of referendum intended for the ratification of the Constitution. It is unarguably clear that the general public's role affected the Treaty's ratification (Almond and Powell,1987.p. 3).

Agenda Setting Theory by McCombs and Shaw (1972). McCombs and Shaw enunciated the theory of shaping public opinion by what the media thinks will attract the public's interest using selected newspapers in Europe. The press draws this connection by reporting sensational editorial pieces as a causal power in shaping the general European Union members' perception in four prominent print media such as TIME Magazine, The Economist, International Herald Tribune, and Financial Times. In its capacity, the media embellished constitutional issues for the public to react to, and this directly and intentionally influenced their perceptions and behavior, failing the Constitution. There are numerous articles on the role of the media in various European Union crises. But none of the items or books have comprehensively treated the media as one of the causes of the constitutional treaty crisis in Europe. The reason is that they tend to focus on the media reportage and its amplifying negative comment without reflecting on the print media's causal power in this case. The crisis would not have been possible if not for the media's proactiveness in disseminating negative perceptions and images on the citizens' minds before the referendum started taking place. Therefore, it is in this area that the present study contributes to existing knowledge. The paper utilized secondary data sources from the library, books, the Internet, magazines, and the data were descriptively and historically analyzed.

1.3 Previous researches

Various leading authorities have carefully defined crises in diverse ways as related to their intellectual disciplines. In viewing the EU constitutional predicament, Sam-Sang (2007), cited by Davis Cross and Xinru Ma (2013, p. 5), eagerly adopted a systemic approach. He precisely defines crises as a state of affairs in which an institution undoubtedly suffers fundamental

instability and social de-equilibrium, endangering its continuous existence. The crisis ostensibly represents a problem that forces an institution to be susceptible to functional disability and a clash of active interests. This can, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly lead to an apparent inability to perform the intended functions of the institution.

Similarly, Hermann (1972,p.187) defines crisis as a phenomenon that threatens the state's fundamental objectives with limited time for decision-makers to address the situation before its escalation. Following this definition, a crisis usually causes a significant challenge to the goal intended to be in a system. This is because the competing social factors do not give time for contending issues to be addressed before escalating to the crisis. Various leading authorities have carefully defined crises in diverse ways as related to their intellectual disciplines. In viewing the EU constitutional predicament, Sam-Sang (2007), cited by Davis Cross and Xinru Ma (2013, p. 5), eagerly adopted a systemic approach. He precisely defines crises as a state of affairs in which an institution undoubtedly suffers fundamental instability and social de-equilibrium, endangering its continuous existence. This ostensibly represents a problem that forces an institution to be susceptible to functional disability and a clash of active interests. This can, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly lead to an apparent inability to perform the intended functions of the institution. Similarly, Hermann (1972,p.187) defines crisis as a phenomenon that threatens the fundamental objectives of the state with limited time for decision-makers to address the situation before its escalation. By this definition, a crisis usually causes friction in attempts for parties to achieve a common interest. But Hermann's idea that the problem attracts limited decision time to make is relatively unpopular. A crisis erupts on the grounds where biases affect the decision-making process. The state of concern does not just begin because there is always an early warning at the

conflict stage. If they do not attend to the early warning signals or the party to a conflict cannot reach a compromise, then the crisis is said to occur. Therefore, on these grounds, the social turmoil takes over a considerable time to escalate.

Furthermore, crisis explodes out of human interactions as they pursue conflicting interests against each other's desires. Argues that the crisis is build-up out of human social relations and the biased way they perceive issues. Social reactions to issues can disproportionately trigger problems. In this paper, the media is the key social actor that started the constitutional treaty event to a crisis by exaggerating and portraying negative ideas that threatened the future of European Union integration. Social behavior helps to see the connectivity between sparking events, media-violence, and crisis perception. It is from this background one insists that it is the media that established the material causes of the crisis.

The European Union, with its de facto Constitution exercised for many years, gave rise to the pursuit of a new constitution championed by Fischer to bring about total integration of Europe, increase the EU's efficiency, provide citizens with transparency and address the Union's perceived democracy and legitimacy deficits. From the EU citizens' argument that the constitution is not necessary as the EU does not lack either democracy or legitimacy. It was also noted that the European Constitution's leading cause stems from the defective management mechanism of constitution-making for a complex union of member states, to embark on constitutional grafting was not the right time, coupled with the unclear contents that greeted the document, making the Constitution less attractive to embrace by the people. The ambiguous nature of the Constitution is evident as it appeared, on the one hand, a treaty and, on the one

hand, a constitution. For instance, looking at the length, detail, and right of each Member State to withdraw from the EU, the full agreement among member states in the process of amending the document, among others, suggest the Constitution was going to fail (Breyer,2005, Pp.37-38). The understanding that the public perceived the ratification of the constitutional Treaty as a threat was why it failed.

The hesitation towards integration is a function of bias for and concern for a change of culture and the national symbols. The contestation is that European citizens were socialized to accept the national power and supreme authority. This idea is supported by (Shaw 2000.Pp.11-12). The European Constitution is the absence of a European demo, pointing out that the European Union fails to possess a cohesive identity establishment amongst the people, a vital prerequisite to holding a constitutional dream. However, the "no-demos" argument, which asserts that the EU Constitution's failure resulted from the lack of shared common culture, history, and identity among European populations, points to the EU's desire to make the Union into a federation. The idea of innovative European integration will weaken their individual role and redistribution of sovereignty. According to Karpas (2007, p. 2), the Constitutional project should have been an authoritative statement of European constitutional self-rule. The Constitution failed for several reasons. The Treaty was defeated in referendums in France and the Netherlands in mid-2005, culminating at the end of the ratification process. The "no" vote from France and the Netherlands resulted from the domestic problems envisaged by the people in the constitutional Treaty. He added that the ambiguous clauses entrenched into the constitutional Treaty by the constitutional crafting representatives were not people-oriented. Hence, citizens and political elites alike across the EU were suspicious of the Treaty's imports of national sovereignty and democracy.

Therefore, it appears the entire constitutional project was not appealing; the constitutional drafting committee did only minute modifications rather than causing a massive mass enlargement of the EU's essential authorization. The cause of the constitutional treaty failure points to strengthening earlier complicated treaties and making them fit for the EU to boost its membership but fails to convincingly sustain the claim that the EU needs such a constitution. The inability to convince the European public was due to the gap between the political leaders and the citizens. Since there was a gap, it became impossible to address the public about the Constitution's importance. In a post-referendum survey in France in 2005, it revealed the reasons for the 'no' vote were essential: that the Constitution would cause unemployment in France, this means resettlement of French enterprises, loss of jobs, miserable economic position in the country amongst others informed of their decision to vote against the constitutional Treaty (Flash Eurobarometer. 2005, Pp.16-20).

It is obvious the heat against the constitutional Treaty was internally generated, and the combustion exploded by the media. The reason is that antagonists of European integration hinged on the idea that if the constitutional Treaty is allowed to see the light of day, their national power would be taken away from them. Such deprivation would relegate their presence on national issues. This doubt created apprehension and anxiety, given the position of the common foreign and security policy, and the European Council's Presidency rekindled the impetus that the Constitution was not laudable for passage. So the desire to counter the European Constitution became necessary as the European Union was utterly going to take over each member state's national government duties.

1.4. Causes of Constitutional Treaty Crisis

1.4.0 The Media

The influence of media exposure on citizens is more reliable than the citizens' exposure to the constitutional Treaty's fundamentals. The media keenly used the citizens' inadequate exposure to the constitutional Treaty against the Treaty's ratification. However, on October 29, 2004, twenty-five heads of government signed a constitutional treaty. Still, Britain and nine other countries chose to take this part of the referenda, which many authorities claimed to be the legitimate root cause of the crisis. The paper wants to debunk claims by most authorities that the negative referenda caused the constitutional crisis. But the point of emphasis here is that the problem did not erupt or start at the failure. During referenda, the vote of no gave birth to the integration reinforcement, which was a blessing in disguise. According to Vassallo (2008), cited by (Davis Cross,2017, p.111) argued that this was not the first time treaties would encounter referenda's initial controversies. Before, many treaties faced negative referenda, but they survived without raising dust at the end of the day, for example, the 1986 Single European Act, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the 2001 Nice Treaty, and so on. Other referenda relating to the adoption of the euro had also hit negative results.

Therefore, if others mentioned above now reference points, why should negative referenda be regarded as the cause of the EU constitutional treaty crisis? Given the above narrative, the atmosphere of failure and crisis started when the Treaty was ready to be ratified. The press hijacked this process by disseminating falsehoods and damaging information to the general public (Davis Cross,2017,p.110). Based on the account that most citizens depend on intermediate information provided through the media to form their opinions about the constitutional Treaty

costs, it was straightforward to play on the citizens' intelligence and emotions to see the Constitution as a threat. Consequently, upon the media's role and influence on the citizens, the little interest and knowledge that mass publics have about the EU integration were compromised, as the press purported facts. They influenced individuals' opinions and expertise to act contrary to the government's expectations, and negative media coverage of the Constitutional Treaty metamorphous to greater public resentment at turning down support for the ratification of the Treaty. For instance, The Financial Times article flashed misleading

Sentiment in international media:

Mass unemployment, deficits, the public debt, the lack of innovation, the slowdown in productivity gains, offshoring, the rise of social fragmentation, senseless violence, the crumbling of social protection, as well as the loss of cultural landmarks all highlight a profound crisis of society which is transforming itself into an immense problem of confidence (Financial Times 2005)

The persuasive effect of the news media on attitudes towards the constitutional Treaty was well established. The narrative so far provides discouraging information about the Constitutional Treaty. Media skills in instigating the crisis with its intensification of disagreement among elites, derogatory statements made about the future of referenda failure, and exaggerated claims about the consequences of a negative vote, prepared a veritable soil for the crisis to germinate. The media, with its powerful instrument, plays dual roles in the crisis. It generated problems and also disproportionately built up trouble with unforgettable striking remarks buttressed at reporting at both levels. The intensity of international media coverage and the damage done served as concrete manifestations of hitting up the situation as a crisis for the EU in the months before the

referendum started. Following the treaty ratification process, The Economist heightened the situation "end of Europe" rhetoric. "The Europe that died" was conspicuously printed on the cover page of the June 4–10, 2005 issue, and the article boldly stated: "The EU should move in the direction of being a looser, less federalist and more decentralized club, the club must pass more powers back to its members" Later that month, The Economist published a cover image of a garbage can with the title 'Where to file Europe's new constitution' In the US, the cover of the June 2005 issue of Time Magazine presented the constitutional crisis as 'The Great Crackup' and the article stated: "In Brussels, there is still a reluctance to admit the obvious: that the constitution is dead" In the second quarter of 2005 only, Le Monde in France released closely 600 articles about the Constitutional Treaty. In the Netherlands, De Telegraaf published over 100 articles on the Treaty. NRC Handelsblad sported the Treaty in over 200 articles in the month before the referendum. Even in Germany, where there was no referendum, newspapers observably heightened coverage of the Constitutional Treaty's ratification process (Crum, 2012, p. 139). Simultaneously, outside the magnitude of content, the international media repetitively disseminates pessimistic forecasts about the upcoming referenda's outcome; such coverage depicted as follows:

The bandwagon against the European constitutional Treaty is rolling out. The expectations that 25 EU countries will sign an agreement are not high. Given the apparent circumstances of a No vote in France and the Netherlands, it is reliable whether there is such a thing as Plan B (Munchau, 2004).

It is worth knowing that with the above efforts of the media, one cannot but to conclude that media orchestrated the crisis, nurtured and blew it beyond proportion with the intention to persuade the public to see the constitutional Treaty in a bad light.

1.4.1. Alienation of the citizens

The citizens' non-integration in the formulation of the Constitution gave birth to the short-circuited information available to them regarding the Constitution's good intentions. The disparities between the elites and the poor were exploited and exaggerated by the strain conveyed through news coverage. The drafting of the Constitutional Treaty was to advance European integration, improve democratic values, and accommodate a broader membership of states to their legitimate functions within the purview of its institutional social structure. It was also a given opportunity to replace the clumsy rules and regulations of other treaties with a single one. Besides this, the constitutional Treaty only represents gradual changes in how the EU will impact citizens' daily lives. For example, novel developments in governance were a considerable interest and priority given to policy areas in a qualified majority vote in Justice and Home Affairs. Adopting it was a measure that would enhance the shift from consensus to a qualified majority voting. It also consists of pulling down the out-of-date pillar system of the Maastricht Treaty, which unnaturally detached JHA from the rest of the community policies. The Constitutional Treaty was brought into existence with a double majority voting system and attained a co-decision-making body for the EU by increasing the European Parliament's power. The Treaty also allows the number of European Commissioners to reflect the number of member states and incorporate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The most fundamental creation was in foreign policy due to the arrival of a European foreign minister, diplomatic service, and permanent president (Howorth 2007:59). Even with these innovations, there was no considerable controversy. The inadequate information of the citizens the media exploited to perpetuate their misleading and fallacious information they fed the general public. The direct democratic link to express opinions by persons of diverse expertise and passing around issues of the Constitutional Treaty between member states and the transnational political arena was lacking (Dawson and

Witte, 2013, p.4-5). The non-involvement of the citizens also culminated in the failure of the ratification process as indicated in the table below:

REJECTED	YET TO DECIDE
France: referendum, May 29, 2005	Luxembourg: referendum, July 10, 2005
Netherlands: referendum, June 1, 2005	Denmark: referendum, September 27, 2005
Ratified: Lithuania: parliament, November 11, 2004	Portugal: referendum, December 2005
Hungary: Parliament, December 20, 2004	Belgium: parliament, June 2005
Slovenia: parliament, February 1, 2005	Estonia: parliament, June 2005
Spain: referendum, February 20, 2005	Cyprus: parliament, June 2005
Greece: parliament, April 19, 2005	Malta: parliament, July 2005
Slovakia: parliament, May 11, 2005	Finland: parliament, Autumn 2005
Austria: parliament, May 25, 2005	Sweden: parliament, December 2005
Germany: Parliament - May 12 and 27 2005	Czech Republic: referendum, mid-2006
Latvia: parliament, June 1, 2005	Britain: referendum, no date set
	Ireland: referendum, no date set
	Poland: undecided

Adapted from (The Guardian 2005)

The Treaty's Failure is a consequence of less attention directed to the citizens' popular mood by the pact's initiators. Therefore, the citizens' perception of the EU competing with nation-states as national symbols became a significant interest matter. It was on the grounds of alienation that citizens made their decisions regarding what they had on their minds about European integration, rather than articulating the Constitution's features and good intentions. For instance, in France and Luxembourg, the necessity to vote against the Treaty was about the internal impact of

furthering European integration of domestic employment and economic situation. The French were also disturbed that the Treaty's seeming neoliberal values would pessimistically impact their domestic costs (Crum, 2012, Pp.144). Thus, the controversy is that citizens found that they were losing their European policymaking rights at all levels. Integration and enlargement would hamper their economic growth, jobs, and immigration issues (Pusca 2009,p. 4). The EU must focus on social areas rather than giving attention to liberal, market-oriented objectives. It was made clear that citizens feared losing their national and cultural identity. More importantly, people's individuality is fundamental for their existence and survival and must be guided jealously. For instance, and from the public's perspective, the story would be fatal if the leaders went on in the same way as now. From an elite perspective, in the words of one Die Zeit article:

In all these, Poles, Slovaks, and Baltics push into our job market. Simultaneously, the old EU states, such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, have not even managed to integrate their long residing minorities from North Africa and Turkey. In Berlin, Amsterdam, and Marseille, a significant dispute is taking place whether Muslim immigrants are even willing to adopt European values and live the European everyday life.

This implies integration at this time created fear and anxiety, which would have been resolved if the media and the political leaders were genuinely responsible for their calls. The implication is that the citizens lacked adequate knowledge about the constitutional Treaty and its offer. The general public needs information. Both the political leaders and the media are responsible for giving them that information. Political leaders charged with enlightening the process leading to the new EU Constitution's ratification have failed in their responsibility. That points to the most important reasons for voting against the Constitution in the Netherlands: inadequate information,

loss of national sovereignty, resistance to the national government, and the high cost of living in Europe. Some analysts believe Dutch voters have used the referendum to express their opposition to speedy European integration (Flash Eurobarometer,2005, p.16-20)

Therefore, the crisis had an insignificant connection with the compact but mainly and significantly to do with knowledge insufficiency that gripped citizens and the lack of elites' ability to "market Europe" satisfactorily and successfully to the public. For instance, post-referenda surveys indicated that citizens did not vote based on curiosity to discard the EU or the Constitutional Treaty's provisions in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland. Furthermore, before the referendum, a Eurobarometer poll conducted to determine the main reasons for reacting against the Constitutional Treaty found that only 11 percent of respondents said that the Treaty was going too far and too quickly (European Commission 2005). These questions regarding the ratification process snowballed into a crisis for Europe on the reason that elites did not know of the high level of public indifference amongst the citizens. In the same vein, (Búrca 2006.p. 206) asserts that the lack of citizen recognition with the European Union as a unit with political responsibilities helped explain the lack of broad public participation with the constitutional process. For instance, the pre-referendum Eurobarometer poll showed that 33 percent of respondents had never gotten wind of the draft European Constitution, and 35 percent wondered whether they supported it or not (European Commission, 2005,p. 3-4). The above is analytical because national political leaders did not enlist the public's support about the issues at stake. On this premise, the public seized an opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with the government in power, using the referendum as a weapon. It shows that power belongs to the people and not

the few who control the state's machinery. Despite the dominance of implementing decisions resting at their table, such choices have to be supported by the public.

1.5. Impact of the crisis on European's stability

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty became a clog at the wheel of European progress. It affected the long-awaited, more substantial, and more united European Union and the possibility of a European Constitution. The idea has become necessary to do away with massive volumes of complex EU legislation that has made decision-making cumbersome over time. The crisis of legitimacy is endemic and evident in Europe with reference to the UK's decision to vote for Brexit. According to Wood (2017,p.1), since the constitutional treaty crisis, a large proportion of EU citizens no longer feel European to key into the goals of European integration. The destructive and misleading roles played by the media, obviously resulting in the dismissal of the constitutional agreement, is instructive and fundamental to the stability of Europe. The excitement of the Leaders that follows on the heels of the Constitutional Treaty was dashed in stone when the public exploited the destructive remarks of the media to reject the Constitution through referenda. The destructive power and the bizarre condemnation by French and Dutch voters threw the EU into a deep crisis. Political leaders well-conceived the Constitutional Treaty for great democratic and enlargement innovations for European integration.

Unfortunately, it had the contrary consequences. The unexpected rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the citizens of the two founding Member States led to a period of devastating sober reflection. The European Union had the relegation of its life when referenda rejected policies approved by its elected representatives. The legitimacy of direct democracy is claimed through the referenda so that citizens could make their choices of their main policy through their representative they elected. The challenge to European Union policies and treaties for the

advancement of European integration has a notable effect on Europe's stability. Since citizens are aware of the power in a free and fair referendum, voters may, in the future, reject the policy position of their elected representatives. Therefore, there are demands to hold a referendum from opposition parties or social movements, thereby causing a protracted effect on Europe's stability. Also, this is to reduce and subordinate the members of parliament to the citizens, as they are aware that even referendums are de facto as they are, yet in a democracy, it is difficult for Members of Parliament to reject the will of the people through a referendum (Richard, 2018, P.207-225).

There is a danger that the European Union's response to its present crisis depletes its ability to be politically responsible and active. For example, in Greece and Hungary, referendum majorities backed their national governments in challenging major EU policies. This means voters rejecting the policies of the European Union through referendum suggests that the legitimacy of their representatives was relegated and lacked the authority to represent them. The effect on the European Union was that it lacked consensus or unanimity amongst member states to move the Union forward for a comprehensive integration (Dawson and Witte, 2013, p.1-2). The failure of the Constitutional Treaty affected a significant alteration in the EU's constitutional framework. The alteration is injurious to European federalism and the Union's unwritten Constitution, which according to Habermas (2011,p.142), the very projects meant to unite European citizens and promote their common identity, such as the euro proving too costly economically, are now distorting transnational solidarity and producing a rise in nationalist and protectionist sentiments.

1.6. Conclusion and recommendations

The role of the media, notably its gloomy predictions and frightening forecast awakening the consciousness of the EU citizens to take unfavorable action against the constitutional Treaty. Although the EU's desire to promote shared values amongst its peoples has existed for a long time, before the conception of the constitutional Treaty, that skeptical attention gripped the atmosphere as Article I-8 of the constitutional Treaty, which lists the Union's official symbols, has something to be questioned. Looking at the effort to codify the symbolic edifice of European identity elicits suspicious interest, regardless of their use by EU elites, to promote identity-building of European integration (Scicluna,2012,p.444). Doubts and skepticism that beclouded the constitutional treaty atmosphere called for great concern. According to Coughlan (a), the drafting of the EU constitution is fundamentally despotic but in the face of democratic genuineness. The convention attempts to impose a Constitution on the EU for closer integration without considering the people's interest within the EU. The claim is that the EU peoples have not agitated for it, stressing that they violated the distinction in the organs of government. The suspicion is even more glaring as the convention only consists of nominees with no widespread authorization from their fellow national citizens or EU citizens. The indication is that the EU Constitution will overrule the sovereignty of Member States and shift those powers to the EU level.

Although changes have been made in the Lisbon Treaty to embrace new policy areas, including the decision-making process, making it equal powers with the European Council. Citizens inclusiveness. The citizens' inclusiveness brings recognition for them to suggest any new policy or make necessary contribution to the decision-making process. Then citizen's Rights protection,

ensures citizens' fundamental rights are respected among others. Despite the innovations that the European Union claims, the Lisbon Treaty still a subject of debate. Furthermore, for a constitution to be all-embracing, the citizens and the media should be carried along. The media should be neutral in the coverage of events and should leave the above sentiment and emotional reportage. Finally, democracy is about people, and for democracy to be sustained, the people must be involved in the running of everyday activities, at least their contributions will make decisions and policies valid and acceptable.

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